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  Abstract 
  This paper explores a model of wage adjustment based on the assumption that information 
disseminates slowly throughout the population of wage setters. This informational frictional yields 
interesting and plausible dynamics for employment and inflation in response to exogenous 
movements in monetary policy and productivity. In this model, disinflations and productivity 
slowdowns have a parallel effect: They both cause the path of employment to fall below the level 
that would prevail under full information. The model implies that, in the face of productivity 
change, a policy of targeting either nominal income or the nominal wage leads to more stable 
employment than does a policy of targeting the price of goods and services. Finally, we examine 
U.S. time series and find that, as the model predicts, unemployment fluctuations are associated with 






  How do employment and inflation respond to real and monetary forces? What frictions 
cause these macroeconomic variables to deviate from the ideals that would arise in a fully classical 
world? These questions are at the center of macroeconomic research, as well as at the center of 
much of Ned Phelps's formidable research career. Early in his career Phelps (1967, 1968), together 
with Milton Friedman (1968), gave us the natural rate hypothesis, which remains the benchmark for 
understanding monetary nonneutrality. More recently, Phelps's work on structural slumps (1994) 
has examined the real forces that can cause the natural rate of unemployment to change over time. 
  This paper offers a model that weaves together these two threads of Phelps's work. In this 
model, information is assumed to disseminate slowly throughout the population of wage setters, 
and as a result, wages respond slowly to news about changing economic conditions. Our model 
includes two kinds of relevant information: news about aggregate demand, as determined by 
monetary policy, and news about equilibrium real wages, as determined by productivity. 
  We introduce this sticky-information model in Section I. The model generalizes the one in 
Mankiw and Reis (2001). In the earlier paper, we applied the assumption of sticky information to 
the price-setting process in order to understand the dynamic response of the economy to monetary 
policy. The resulting model has three properties that are consistent with the conventional wisdom of 
central bankers and the empirical evidence of macroeconometricians. First, disinflations in the 
model are always contractionary (although announced disinflations are less contractionary than 
surprise ones). Second, the model predicts that monetary policy shocks have their maximum impact 





the model implies that the change in inflation is positively correlated with the level of economic 
activity, which is the well-known "accelerationist Phillips curve." The model presented here 
encompasses the previous model--and thus these results--as a special case. 
  In Section II we offer some new results that come from applying the sticky-information 
assumption to the labor market and introducing productivity as an additional driving force. We 
show that disinflations and productivity slowdowns have parallel effects: both cause employment 
and output to fall below their classical levels until the information about the new regime works its 
way through the economy. Thus, the model may help explain why unemployment rose during the 
productivity slowdown of the 1970s and yet again during the Volcker disinflation of the early 
1980s. It may also help explain why the productivity resurgence associated with the "new economy" 
of the 1990s coincided with falling unemployment. Ball and Moffitt (2001) and Staiger, Stock, and 
Watson (2001) have recently documented the empirical importance of productivity trends for shifts 
in the Phillips curve. The sticky-information model presented here offers one interpretation of those 
findings. 
  In Section III we examine how the economy reacts to a change in trend productivity if the 
monetary authority responds either by stabilizing employment or by stabilizing inflation. We find 
that a strict policy of stabilizing inflation causes large fluctuations in employment. We also find that 
the employment-stabilizing policy keeps both nominal income and the nominal wage on its 
predetermined path. These results are a warning for the many central banks around the world that 





more stable if the monetary authority used nominal income or the price of labor, rather than the 
price of goods and services, as its nominal anchor. 
  In Section IV we use the model as a lens through which to examine U.S. quarterly time 
series. According to the model, employment is a function of unexpected movements in inflation 
and productivity, where expectations are formed at various points in the past. The key parameter 
that governs this relationship is the one that measures the stickiness of information. When we apply 
the model and estimate this parameter, we find the average wage setter updates his information 
about once a year. Moreover, the correlation between predicted and actual unemployment is as high 
as 0.60. Thus, the sticky-information model can be used to explain much of the observed variation 
in aggregate unemployment as a response to inflation and productivity surprises. One anomaly, 
however, is that productivity surprises appear to influence unemployment with a lag of several 
quarters. 
  This paper brings together many elements from the literature on inflation-employment 
dynamics that Phelps helped to spawn. The natural rate hypothesis, imperfect information, 
infrequent adjustment, and the wage curve all play central roles in the model. Our goal is not to 
offer a radically new theory but to combine familiar elements in a new way in an attempt to better 
explain monetary nonneutrality and structural slumps. 
 
I. The Wage Curve Meets Sticky Information 





output. There are two key elements: the wage curve and the assumption of sticky information. 
 
The Wage Curve 
  The starting point is an equation describing the target nominal wage w*:  
   w * t  =  pt  +  θ t  +  α et, 
where p is the price level, θ  is labor productivity, and e is employment. All variables are in logs, 
and employment is normalized so that it averages zero. This equation resembles the wage curve, as 
in Phelps (1994) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1995). Some might call it a "pseudo labor supply 
curve." 
  The simplest way to motivate this equation is from the standpoint of a union that sets 
wages. The union has a target for the real wage that depends on its workers' productivity. In 
addition, high employment makes the union more aggressive, raising the wages they demand. 
  Another way to view this wage equation is from the standpoint a firm that sets wages in an 
efficiency-wage environment. The wage curve describes a "no shirking condition." Firms pay 
productive workers more because they have better outside alternatives. In addition, high 
employment raises shirking among workers, because unemployment is a less potent threat. As a 
result, high employment induces firms to offer higher wages. 
 
The Sticky Information Assumption 





based on imperfect information. Every wage setter sets a new wage every period, but they collect 
information about the economy and update their decisions slowly over time. 
  Our assumption about information arrival is analogous to the adjustment assumption in the 
Calvo (1983) model of price adjustment. That is, adjustment occurs as a Poisson process. In each 
period, a fraction λ  of the wage setters obtains new information about the state of the economy and 
recomputes optimal plans based on that new information. Other wage setters continue to set wages 
based on old plans and outdated information. Each wage setter has the same probability of being 
one of those updating their information, regardless of how long it has been since its last update.
1 
  A wage setter that last updated its information j periods ago sets the wage 
  w
j
t  =  Et-j w*t. 
The aggregate wage is the average of wages in the economy: 
       ∞  




     j = 0  
These two equations, together with the wage curve equation above, fully describe the process of 
wage setting. 
  The rest of the model is conventional. The overall price level is determined by the level of 
wages and labor productivity: 
                     
    
1 A natural question is whose expectations suffer from the stickiness of information.  Under the 
union interpretation of the wage curve, the expectations are clearly those of the union workers.  The 
answer is less obvious in the efficiency-wage interpretation, according to which the wage curve 
represents the no-shirking condition.  In this case, firms set the wages, but because the firms are 





  p t  =  wt  -  θ t. 
This equation is both the supply curve in the output market (prices depend on costs) and the 
demand curve in the labor market (the real wage depends on productivity). The level of output is 
determined by employment and labor productivity: 
  y t  =  et  +  θ t. 
This is the production function. The above five equations together make up the aggregate-supply 
side of the model. 
  It is worth noting what happens in the limiting case when information is perfect (λ =1). It is 
straightforward to show that in this case, e=0 and y=θ . That is, under perfect information, 
employment is constant, and output mirrors productivity. In this model, all employment dynamics 
follow from the assumed stickiness of information. 
 
The Sticky Information Phillips Curve 
  We can solve for the price level as a function of output by combining the previous five 
equations. The resulting aggregate supply equation is 
           ∞  
  p t  =  { λ   Σ   (1 - λ )
j  Et-j[ pt  +  α yt  +  (1 - α ) θ t] } -  θ t. 
         j=0 
With this equation in hand, another special case is apparent. If there are no productivity shocks 
(θ =0), the model simplifies to the price adjustment model in Mankiw and Reis (2001). Thus, the 





  With some tedious algebra, which we leave to the appendix, this equation for the price level 
yields the following equation for the inflation rate: 
                  ∞  
  π t  =  [αλ  / (1 - λ ) ] et  -  ∆θ t  +  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j  Et-1-j ( π t  +  ∆θ t  +  α∆ et), 
                j=0 
where ∆ et=et-et-1. We call this the sticky-information Phillips curve. 
  Let's examine each of the determinants of inflation in this model: (1) High employment 
means higher inflation: This is the conventional short-run Phillips curve. Here it arises because high 
employment raises target wages, which in turn raises costs and thus the prices charged by firms. (2) 
Higher productivity growth lowers inflation because it lowers firms' costs of production. (3) Higher 
expected inflation raises inflation because, by virtue of the sticky information assumption, past 
expectations are still affecting current wage increases. (4) Higher expected productivity growth 
raises inflation because it influences the wages that wage-setters thought were appropriate. (5) 
Higher expected employment growth also raises inflation because it also influences expected target 
wages. 
 
Comparison to a Leading Competitor 
  This sticky-information Phillips curve is very different from the "new Keynesian Phillips 
curve" that has become popular in recent years. The latter model is based on the work of Taylor 
(1980), Rotemberg (1982), and Calvo (1983). It implies an expectation-augmented Phillips curve 





shocks for the moment, the new Keynesian Phillips curve can be written as:  
   π t  =  γ  et  +  Etπ t+1. 
For a notable example of a paper applying this model of inflation dynamics, see Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (1999). McCallum (1997) has called this model "the closest thing there is to a standard 
specification," while Goodfriend and King (1997) say it is part of a "new neoclassical synthesis" in 
macroeconomics. 
  Yet this model has some significant empirical flaws. Mankiw (2001) argues that it is 
inconsistent with conventional views about the effects of monetary policy. Mankiw and Reis (2001) 
compare it with a simple version of the sticky-information model and show that the sticky-
information model yields more plausible dynamics. In particular, according to the new Keynesian 
Phillips curve, inflation responds immediately and substantially to monetary shocks, whereas 
according to the sticky-information Phillips curve, the effect of monetary shocks on inflation is 
delayed and gradual. 
  The key difference between the models comes from the role of expectations. The new 
Keynesian Phillips curve gives a prominent role to current expectations of future inflation. These 
expectations can adjust quickly in response to changes in monetary policy. By contrast, the sticky-
information Phillips curve gives a prominent role to past expectations of current inflation. These 
expectations are predetermined and, thus, cannot change quickly. In this way, the sticky-
information model more closely resembles an earlier generation of price-adjustment models 






II. Disinflations and Productivity Slowdowns 
  We now consider the dynamics of employment and inflation in this sticky-information 
model. To do this, we need to close the model with a specification for aggregate demand. One 
approach to doing this would be to add a goods market equilibrium condition (that is, an IS curve) 
and a monetary policy reaction function for the interest rate (such as a Taylor rule). This approach 
has several advantages and might be pursued in future work. But in this paper, we adopt an 
approach that, although perhaps less realistic, is simpler and more transparent. We use a simple 
money-market equilibrium condition: 
   m t  -  pt  =  β  yt. 
The parameter β  is the income elasticity of money demand. More important for our purposes, it 
determines the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve. The smaller is β , the flatter is the aggregate 
demand curve. The variable m can be viewed narrowly as the money supply or broadly as a 
summary measure of all variables that shift the aggregate demand for goods and services. Thus, we 
can refer to m as either money or aggregate demand. 
  With this equation, we have now fully described the model. For purposes of numerical 
illustration, we need to choose values for the parameters. We pick β =1/2. For some of the 
qualitative results reported below, it is important that β <1. We also set α =0.1 and λ =0.25. The 
value of α  measures the sensitivity of the target real wage to labor-market conditions. In the 





taken to be a quarter, then λ =0.25 means that wage setters update their information on average once 
a year. These parameter values strike us as plausible, and we will use them only for the purposes of 
illustration. In a later section, we use the time-series data to estimate λ , the key parameter 
measuring the stickiness of information, and find that λ =0.25 fits the data well. 
  Here we look at how this economy responds to a sudden change in regime. In the first case, 
we assume that the annual rate of growth of money m falls by 2 percentage points, or 0.5 percentage 
points per quarter. In the second case, we assume that the growth rate of productivity θ  falls by this 
amount. In each case, the change in the exogenous growth rate is assumed to be sudden, 
unexpected, and permanent. 
   The appendix explains in detail how we solve for the resulting equilibrium path for the 
economy, while here we present and discuss the solution in more intuitive terms. Figure 1 shows 
the response to each of these disturbances. The top panel shows the path of employment e, and the 
bottom panel shows the response of inflation π . Recall that the natural rate of employment in this 
model--the level of employment that would prevail if information were perfect--is normalized to 
zero. Thus, the employment variable measures how far the economy is operating from what might 
be viewed as its "full employment" level.  
  Figure 1 shows that employment follows a hump-shaped pattern in response to both 
disinflations and productivity slowdowns. Employment falls for a while as the impact of the change 
in regime builds over time. But then the effect on employment dissipates as the information about 





maximum impact on employment occurs at 6 quarters, although of course this result is sensitive to 
the parameter values we have picked. 
  The two inflation paths in the bottom of Figure 1 are quite different from each other. In the 
case of a slowdown in money growth, inflation declines only gradually. It overshoots the new lower 
level briefly as agents learn of the new regime and correct their previous mistakes. In the case of a 
productivity slowdown, inflation immediately spikes up, as firms pass on higher costs to 
consumers. Inflation gradually declines as wages start reflecting lower productivity growth. After a 
brief period of overshooting, inflation eventually settles at a new higher level. 
  The reader might have noticed that the dynamic paths for employment are similar in the 
case of disinflations and productivity slowdowns. This is not a coincidence. In fact, the appendix 
proves the following: 
 




This naturally leads to: 
 







The intuition behind the corollary is the following: Adverse news about productivity influences 
target nominal wages in two ways. Target nominal wages fall because target real wages are lower, 
and they rise because the price level is higher. If β =1 and the path of m is held constant, these two 
effects exactly cancel. In this special case, wages stay exactly on track to maintain full employment, 
despite the slow diffusion of information. 
 
III. Stabilization Policy in the Face of Productivity Change 
  The outcomes shown in Figure 1 assume that when the economy experiences a productivity 
slowdown, the monetary authority holds aggregate demand on the same path that it otherwise 
would have followed. This benchmark is natural, but it need not hold. As employment and inflation 
fluctuate, the monetary authority may well respond by altering aggregate demand. Here we consider 
two other natural benchmarks. 
  One possibility is that the monetary authority may choose a policy to stabilize employment. 
This means it would adjust aggregate demand m to keep e=0 at all times. Because fluctuations in 
employment in this model arise because of imperfections in private information and because the 
monetary authority is assumed to have full information, it might well try to achieve the level of 
employment and output that private decisionmakers would choose on their own if only they were 
better informed. 





aggregate demand to maintain a constant inflation rate. This benchmark is interesting in part 
because many central banks are in fact now committed to inflation targeting as a policy framework 
(although many such regimes allow temporary deviations from a strict target). 
  There is also another reason to focus on the employment path that follows under an 
inflation-stabilizing policy: This path corresponds to what econometricians might measure as the 
NAIRU (the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment). In this model, the natural rate of 
employment--that is, the level that would prevail with full information--is assumed constant. Yet 
the rate of employment associated with nonaccelerating inflation is not constant. To find the level 
of employment that corresponds to the measured NAIRU, we can solve the model assuming that 
monetary policy stabilizes inflation. 
  Figure 2 shows employment and inflation in response to a productivity slowdown under 
three policies: constant aggregate demand, employment stabilization, and inflation stabilization. 
The appendix presents the details of solution. 
  The figure shows that inflation stabilization leads to very large fluctuations in employment. 
To extinguish the impact on inflation, monetary policy responds to the adverse shift in aggregate 
supply by contracting aggregate demand. This instability in employment under inflation 
stabilization can be viewed as a warning to the many central banks around the world that have 
adopted inflation targeting. In essence, a productivity slowdown in this model looks like a rise in 
the NAIRU. This is consistent with the empirical results in Ball and Moffitt (2001) and Staiger, 





full information--has not changed. The fall in employment that results from a productivity 
slowdown is no more desirable in this model than any other downturn. Yet a policy of inflation 
stabilization not only tolerates the downturn in employment but exacerbates it to keep inflation 
under control. 
  Figure 2 also shows that a policy of employment stabilization leads to a permanent rise in 
the inflation rate. That is, for the central bank to maintain full employment during a productivity 
slowdown, it has to accommodate the adverse shift in aggregate supply by raising aggregate 
demand, permitting a higher inflation rate. The rise in inflation needed to stabilize employment 
equals the magnitude of the slowdown in productivity growth. That is, a slowdown of 2 percent per 
year requires an increase in the inflation rate of 2 percentage points. 
  There are other ways to describe the policy of stabilizing employment. It turns out that along 
the path with stable employment, both nominal income (p+y) and the nominal wage (w) equal their 
previously expected values. Turning this observation around leads to a policy: If the central bank 
commits to keeping either nominal income or the nominal wage at a constant level (or growing at 
some constant rate), aggregate demand and inflation in the price of goods and services will 
automatically respond to a productivity shift by exactly the right amount to maintain full 
employment. 
  Overall, this model suggests that inflation targeting may not be the best framework for 
monetary policy in the face of changing productivity. A better target variable than the price of 





nominal income or the nominal wage gives monetary policy a nominal anchor, but it does so in a 
way that permits greater stability in employment. There is a long tradition suggesting the 
desirability of nominal income targeting; see Tobin (1980) and Hall and Mankiw (1994) for two 
examples. But, as far as we know, the possibility of targeting the price of labor has not received 
much attention. 
  One exception is the plan discussed in Phelps (1978). Phelps concludes, “the program 
envisioned here aims to stabilize wages on a level or rising path, leaving the price level to be 
buffetted by supply shocks and exchange-rate disturbances.” This is precisely the policy suggested 
by the sticky-information model of wage setting. We agree with Phelps that nominal wage targeting 
seems like a promising alternative to inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule
2. 
 
IV. An Empirical Application 
  In the model presented here, inflation and productivity surprises drive employment 
fluctuations. This section examines this prediction using U.S. time series data to get a sense of how 
well the model works and to learn where it has problems matching the world. 
 
The Approach 
  We start with the sticky-information Phillips curve presented earlier: 
                     
2 Aoki (2001) presents a related result: In a world with a sticky-price sector and a flexible-price 
sector, optimal monetary policy targets inflation in the sticky-price sector. In our model, the labor 






                 ∞  
  π t  =  [ αλ  / (1 - λ ) ] et  -  ∆θ t  +  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j  Et-1-j( π t  +  ∆θ t  +  α∆ et ). 
                 j=0 
Now turn this equation around to use it as a theory of employment: 
                    ∞  
 e t  =  [ (1 - λ ) / αλ  ] [ π t  +  ∆θ t  -  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-1-j (π t  +  ∆θ t  +  α∆ et ) ]. 
                   j=0 
This equation implicitly expresses employment as a function of inflation, productivity, and the past 
expectations of these variables. 
  Our goal is to see whether this equation can help explain observed U.S. fluctuations. To do 
this, we make two auxiliary assumptions. 
  First, we assume that inflation and productivity growth follow univariate stochastic 
processes. Their moving average representations can be written as: 
             ∞  
  π t  =  Σ   ρ j ε t-j 
             j=0 
 
 
        ∞  
  ∆θ t  =   Σ   η j vt-j 
   j = 0  
In this case, the expectations of inflation and productivity growth are a function of their past 
univariate innovations.
3 As the appendix shows, the model can now be solved as 
                     
    
3 In reality, expectations may also depend on other information.  For example, news about 
monetary policy may affect expected inflation.  But experience suggests that the improvement from 
multivariate over univariate forecasting is often slight.  Future work could improve upon this 
assumption, but we probably don't go too far wrong assuming univariate processes for inflation and 






     ∞           ∞  
    α  et  =  Σ  γ j  ε t-j  +  Σ  ψ j vt-j 
       j=0          j=0 
where the parameters {γ j} and {ψ j} are functions of {ρ j}, {η j}, and λ . This equation can be used to 
predict fluctuations in employment, taking as inputs the univariate innovations in inflation and 
productivity. 
  Second, we assume that the observed unemployment rate is linearly related to a moving 
average of e, the employment variable in our model. In particular, the unemployment rate u is 
assumed to be:  





t is defined as 
  e
s
t  =  [ et-3  +  2et-2  +  3et-1  +  4et  +  3et+1  +  2et+2  +  et+3] / 16. 
We found that without any smoothing of the predicted employment variable, the model produces 
too much high-frequency variation in the predicted unemployment rate. This triangular filter 
smooths out the rapid quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in the predicted series, leaving the business 
cycle variation and the longer-term trends.
4 
  Given these two auxiliary assumptions, we can use the model to produce a predicted path of 
unemployment for any given set of parameters. The predicted unemployment rate in any period 
                     
    
4 There are two natural hypotheses to explain the high-frequency variation predicted by the model 
without the filter.  (1) Some high-frequency variation in productivity growth and inflation is 
measurement error.  (2) The high-frequency variation in productivity growth and inflation in the 
data is real, but for some reason, employment responds more sluggishly in the world than it does in 





depends on the history of shocks to inflation and productivity. 
 
Parameter Estimation 
  The next issue is how to choose the parameters. We estimate the parameters of the 
univariate processes for inflation and productivity growth as autoregressions using ordinary least 
squares. We then invert these autoregressions to obtain {ρ j} and {η j}, the parameters of the moving 
average representations. The residuals from the autoregressions are the shocks, {ε t} and {vt}, that 
we feed into the model to explain fluctuations in unemployment. 
  The remaining three parameters are λ ,  δ 0, and δ 1/α . (The parameters α  and δ 1 are not 
separately identified.) We estimate these parameters using a least-squares procedure. That is, we 
choose these parameters to minimize the sum of squared deviations between predicted and actual 
unemployment. 
  The results from this procedure have a simple interpretation. The estimated δ 0 equals the 
mean unemployment rate. The estimated δ 1/α  ensures that the prediction error is not correlated with 
the predicted value. These two parameters do not affect the autocorrelations of predicted 
unemployment or the cross-correlations between predicted and actual. In some sense, these 
parameters aren't interesting: Changing δ 0 and δ 1/α  alters the mean and variance of predicted 
unemployment without altering the dynamics in any other way. 
  The interesting parameter is λ , which measures the rate of information arrival. Our least 





value for λ  that maximizes the correlation between predicted and actual unemployment. 
  
Data and Results 
  We use quarterly, seasonally adjusted U.S. data from the first quarter of 1959 to the first 
quarter of 2001. Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. Productivity growth is the 
growth of output per hour in the business sector. Unemployment is the civilian unemployment rate. 
  The univariate autoregressions indicate that inflation and productivity growth follow very 
different stochastic processes. Productivity growth is indistinguishable from white noise, indicating 
no persistence. By contrast, inflation is well modelled as an AR(3) with autoregressive parameters 
0.37, 0.22, and 0.29. These three coefficients on lagged inflation sum to 0.88, indicating that 
inflation is borderline nonstationary. We use the white noise specification for productivity growth 
and the AR(3) parameters for inflation to calculate the moving average parameters and the 
estimated innovations.
5 
  Next we fit the model using the unemployment data. The estimated value of λ , the rate of 
information arrival, is 0.25. This means that wage setters in the economy update their information 
                     
    
5 When we tried using an estimated AR(3) process for productivity growth, the results were 
almost the same as those reported here, because the estimated autoregressive coefficients were so 
small.  Notice that the case we use, according to which the level of productivity follows a random 
walk, is similar to the specifications commonly used in the real business cycle literature. Exploring 
alternative processes may be fruitful in future work. If we had assumed a stochastic process with a 
slowly changing conditional mean (such as an IMA(1,1) process with a large, negative MA 
parameter), then employment would be related to productivity growth minus a weighted average of 
past productivity growth. This specification would more closely resemble the one in Ball and 





on average every 4 quarters. Figure 3 shows the actual and predicted unemployment rate using this 
estimate. The correlation between these two series is 0.47. 
  Figure 4 decomposes the predicted unemployment rate from Figure 3 into two pieces. The 
top panel shows the piece of predicted unemployment that is driven by inflation innovations. The 
bottom panel shows the piece of predicted unemployment that is driven by productivity 
innovations. Actual unemployment is shown in both panels, and all the parameters are held constant 
at the same values as in Figure 3. 
  The figure shows that inflation and productivity innovations are both important for 
explaining unemployment. The correlation of unemployment with the inflation piece of the 
predicted series is 0.33. The correlation of unemployment with the productivity piece is 0.17. 
  Inspection of Figure 4 reveals an anomaly: Unemployment as predicted by productivity 
innovations moves in advance of actual unemployment. Although this piece of predicted 
unemployment has a correlation with contemporaneous unemployment of only 0.17, its correlation 
with unemployment one year ahead is 0.48. Productivity appears to take more time to influence 
unemployment in the world than it does in our model. 
  As a rough (and, we admit, ad hoc) fix for this lagged response, we add a four-quarter delay 
to the estimated model. The employment equation becomes 
 
     ∞           ∞  
    α  et  =  Σ  γ j  ε t-j  +  Σ  ψ j vt-j-4. 
      j=0          j=0 





identical to our earlier estimate. The predicted and actual unemployment rates, shown in Figure 5, 
now have a correlation of 0.60. Adding this lag in the effect of productivity significantly improves 
the model's fit. 
  In the end, the empirical verdict on this model is mixed. On the one hand, the model fails to 
capture some important dynamics in the data. The delay between productivity innovations and 
unemployment is a puzzle.
6 On the other hand, inflation and productivity surprises can account for 
much of the observed evolution in U.S. unemployment. The simulation in Figure 5 captures many 
of the main features of the unemployment data, including the big recessions in 1975 and 1982, the 
rising trend level of unemployment rate during the 1970s and early 1980s, and the declining 
unemployment rate in the late 1990s. 
  There are many ways in which this empirical model could be improved. The model 
excludes many determinants of unemployment, such as changing demographics, unionization, and 
minimum wage laws. It also excludes many shocks that might shift the inflation-unemployment 
relationship, such as exchange rates, food and energy prices, and wage-price controls. The only 
inputs into these simulations are inflation and productivity surprises. Absent changes in measured 
productivity, the model interprets all movements in inflation as driven by aggregate demand. 
Incorporating other sources of unemployment and inflation fluctuations into the model, and adding 
                     
    
6 This delay in the response to productivity shocks may be related to the mechanism highlighted 
in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (1998).  If prices are sticky in the short run, then a good productivity 
shock can reduce employment, because firms need fewer workers to produce the same level of 
output.  Another possibility is that the short-run changes in measured labor productivity are a 






a richer dynamic structure to better explain the link between productivity and employment, are tasks 
we leave for future work. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  Since Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967,1968) introduced the natural rate hypothesis in the 
1960s, expectations have played a central role in understanding the dynamics of inflation and 
employment. Early empirical work testing the hypothesis was based on the assumption of adaptive 
expectations, according to which expected inflation is a weighted average of past inflation. Yet 
Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1971) forcefully criticized that approach. Since then, economists have 
most often relied on the assumption of rational expectations. 
  Over time, however, economists have increasingly realized that while agents may be too 
smart to form expectations adaptively, they may not be smart enough to form them rationally. 
Unfortunately, finding a safe haven between the stupidity of adaptive expectations and the hyper-
intelligence of rational expectations is not easy. Friedman (1979), Summers (1986), and Sargent 
(1999) have explored the possibility that least-squares learning can help explain how expectations 
evolve over time. Sims (2001) has suggested modelling agents' limited capacity for processing 
information. Ball (2000) has proposed that agents form optimal univariate forecasts, but ignore the 
possible gains from multivariate forecasts. Each of these approaches has some appeal, but each 
lacks the parsimony that makes rational expectations so compelling. 





previous paper attempts to model agents that are smart, but not too smart. Our agents form 
expectations rationally, but they do not do so often. Because of either costs of acquiring information 
or costs of recomputing optimal plans, information diffuses slowly throughout the population. As a 
result, expectations conditional on old information continue to influence current behavior. 
  Recently, many economists have been pursuing "behavioral economics," a research program 
that tries to incorporate the insights of psychology into economics. The starting point of this work is 
the observation that people are not quite as rational as the homo economicus assumed in standard 
models. The sticky-information model of inflation-employment dynamics can be viewed as a 
modest contribution to this literature. The closest antecedent is the work of Gabaix and Laibson 
(2001), which tries to explain consumption behavior and the equity premium puzzle by assuming 
that consumers are slow to recognize changes in the values of their portfolios. The sticky-
information model we have presented here applies the analogous assumption to the process of wage 
setting. 
  From a theoretical standpoint, assuming sticky information is an attempt to have your cake 
and eat it too. Like many previous efforts, our model tries to describe agents who do not fully 
understand their environment and gradually learn about it over time. This lack of full understanding 
motivates our application of Calvo's assumption of Poisson adjustment to the acquisition of 
information. Whether this approach is the best way to model the imperfections of human behavior 
is hard to say. But without doubt, it has a major advantage: Once this leap of faith is taken, the 





  Of course, the validity of this model of inflation-unemployment dynamics is ultimately an 
empirical question. The model fits some broad stylized facts. In our previous paper, we showed that 
the model can explain the dynamic response of the economy to monetary policy: It can explain why 
disinflations are costly, why monetary shocks have a delayed and gradual effect on inflation, and 
why changes in inflation are positively correlated with the level of economic activity. This paper 
has moved the analysis to the labor market and introduced a role for productivity as a driving force. 
The model can now explain why productivity slowdowns, such as the one that occurred in the 
1970s, are associated with rising unemployment (and a rising NAIRU) and why productivity 
accelerations, such as the one that occurred in the United States in the 1990s, are associated with 
declining unemployment (and a declining NAIRU). When we applied the model to U.S. time series 
data, we found that inflation and productivity surprises account for a sizable fraction of observed 
unemployment fluctuations. 
  The model proposed here suggests a possible problem with the policy of inflation targeting 
that many of the world's central banks adopted during the 1990s. In this model, stabilizing 
employment in the face of a productivity slowdown requires a rise in the inflation rate of an equal 
magnitude. The model suggests that a better nominal anchor than the price of goods and services is 
nominal income or the nominal wage. Targeting inflation in the price of labor, rather than in the 






  This appendix formally justifies some of the claims asserted in the body of the paper. 
 
The sticky-information Phillips Curve. 
  The three equations describing wage setting, together with the demand for labor lead to: 
         ∞  
(A1)   pt  =  { λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j  Et-j [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ] }  -  θ t. 
       j=0 
Take out the first term to obtain: 
                          ∞  
(A2)   pt  =  λ  [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ]  +  { λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j+1 Et-1-j [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ] } -  θ t 
               j=0 
and subtract the pt-1 version of (A1) from (A2) to obtain, after some rearranging: 
            ∞  
(A3)   π t  =  λ  [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ]  +  { λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-1-j [π t  +  α∆ et  +  ∆θ t ] }  
            j = 0  
             ∞  
   -   λ
2 Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-1-j [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ] } -  ∆θ t 
                j=0 
where ∆  is the first difference operator and the inflation rate is π t = ∆ pt. Multiplying through 
equation (A2) by λ  and rearranging, we get: 
           ∞  
(A4)   (1  –  λ )  λ
2  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-1-j [ pt  +  α et  +  θ t ]  =  
           j=0 
     =     λ  [ (1 – λ ) pt  -  λα et  +  (1 - λ ) θ t]. 
Replacing (A4) for the last term in (A3) leads to, after rearranging, the sticky information 





                    ∞  
(A5)   π t  =  [ αλ  / (1 - λ ) ] et  -  ∆θ t  +  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-1-j (π t  +  ∆θ t  +  α∆ et ). 
                  j=0 
The response of employment and inflation to a fall in the growth rate of aggregate demand 
and productivity. 
 Replacing  for  yt using the aggregate demand equation into the aggregate supply equation, 
we obtain the law of motion for the price level: 
         ∞  
(A6)   pt  =  { λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-j [ (1 - α /β ) pt  +  (α /β ) mt  +  (1 - α ) θ t ] } -  θ t. 
       j=0 
  First, say that mt was growing at the rate 0.005, up to date –1, when it reaches the level 0. 
Then, unexpectedly, the growth rate falls to 0, so mt stays at level 0 forever. Formally: mt= 
0.005(1+t) for t≤ -1 and mt= 0 for t≥ 0. Also, set θ t= 0 for all t. Then, we can break equation (A6) 
into two components: 
      t  
(A7)   pt  =  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-j [ (1 - α /β ) pt  +  (α /β ) mt ]  + 
               j=0 
               ∞  
    +   λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-j  [ (1 - α /β ) pt  +  (α /β ) mt ]. 
            j=t+1 
In the first summation term are included the agents that set their expectations after the change in 
mt. Thus, they set expectations with full information: Et-j(pt)= pt and Et-j(mt)= 0. In the second 
summation term are agents who set expectations prior to the change: Et-j(pt)= Et-j(mt)= 
0.005(1+t). Thus, (A7) becomes: 
(A8)   pt  =  (1 - α /β ) (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) pt  +  0.005 (1+t) (1-λ )
t+1 
which, after rearranging, gives the solution: 
(A9)   pt  =  [ 0.005 (1 + t) (1 - λ )
t+1 ]  /  [ 1 - (1 - α /β ) (1 - (1-λ )





Employment is given by et= - pt/β  and inflation is π t = ∆ pt. 
  The fall in productivity is formalised as: θ t= 0.005(1+t) for t≤ -1 and θ t= 0 for t≥ 0, and 
mt= 0 for all t. Starting again from (A6) we obtain, by very similar steps, the response of prices: 
(A10)   pt  =  [ 0.005 (1 - β ) (1 + t)(1 - λ )
t+1 ]  /  [1 - (1 - α /β ) (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1)]. 
Inflation and employment follow immediately. 
 
Proof of the Proposition and Corollary. 
  Starting from (A1), replacing for pt from the aggregate demand equation and for yt from 
the production function, we obtain the expectational difference equation for employment as a 
function of the two exogenous processes, mt and θ t: 
                  ∞         
(A11)   β et  =  mt  +  (1 - β ) θ t  –  λ  Σ  (1-λ )
j  Et-j [ mt  +  (1 - β ) θ t  +  (α  - β ) et ] }. 
                         j=0 
  If we define the composite disturbance: mt + (1-β )θ t, employment is solely driven by this 
term. Shocks to mt or (1-β )θ t have exactly the same effect on the equation above and thus on 
employment. This shows the Proposition. The Corollary follows from setting β =1 in (A11) and 






Stabilization Policy and Productivity Change. 
  Start with the stable employment policy. From (A11), it follows that if mt = -(1-β )θ t then 
we obtain an expectational difference equation involving only et, which has solution et = 0. This 
is the policy that stabilizes employment. Given the path for θ t above, we then have the policy 
path mt, and since we know this ensures et = 0, then yt= θ t from the production function. The path 
of prices pt comes from the aggregate demand equation pt= -θ t. A permanent drop in the growth 
rate of productivity therefore leads to a permanent rise in inflation. 
  Alternatively, note that combining the wage curve and the labor demand (output supply) 
equations into the equation for the aggregate wage we obtain: 
     ∞  
(A12)   wt  =  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-j  [ wt  +  α et ]. 
                j=0 
From (A12), having the wage rate equal to some forever known constant ensures et = 0. Without 
loss of generality, set that constant to zero. The associated policy is mt = -(1-β )θ t, from using the 
aggregate demand equation and the production function. Thus, an employment stabilization 
policy is equivalent to a policy that stabilizes the wage rate in the sense of having wt 
deterministic or known to all. 
  Similarly, use the labor demand and the production function equations to replace for wt 
and θ t in (A12) above and obtain: 
              ∞  
(A13)   pt  +  yt  –  et  =  λ  Σ  (1-λ )
j Et-j [ pt  +  yt  +  (1-α )et ]. 
             j=0 
Thus, by the same argument as above, stabilizing nominal income pt + yt is equivalent to 
stabilizing employment. 





to zero, and the level to zero as well, so the policy aim is to have pt = 0 at all periods. From the 
law of motion for the price level in (A6) and the set path for prices: 
   ∞  
(A14)   θ t  =  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Et-j [ (α /β ) mt  +  (1 - α ) θ t ].  
   j = 0  
Given a path for θ t, the necessary path of policy is given by the solution to this equation. For t ≤  -
1, all agents have full information and θ t = 0.005(1+t) so the policy is: mt = 0.005β  (1+t). For t≥ 0, 
breaking the sum in two components, the first referring to informed agents that set their 
expectations at or after date 0, and the second to uninformed agents that set their expectations 
before date 0, we obtain: 
(A15)    0  =  (α /β ) ( 1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) mt  +  0.005 (1 + t) (1 - λ )
t+1 
which, after rearranging, becomes: 
(A16)   mt  =  - [ 0.005 β  (1 + t)(1 - λ )
t+1 ]  /  [ α   -  α  (1 - λ )
t+1]. 
The path for employment for t ≥  0 is et = yt = mt/β . 
 
Empirical implementation. 
  Since the only forces driving employment are inflation and productivity growth, the 
general solution for employment will be a linear function (with undetermined coefficients) of the 
shocks to these variables: 
                ∞  
(A17)   α  et  =  Σ  ( γ j ε t-j  +  ψ j vt-j  ). 
                j=0 
Using the MA representations for inflation, productivity growth and employment, plugging these 





     ∞                  ∞  
(A18)   Σ  (γ j ε t-j  +  ψ j vt-j)  =  [ (1 - λ ) / λ  ] [Σ  ( ρ j ε t-j  +  η j vt-j )  - 
             j=0                j=0 
              ∞      ∞  
  –    {  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j  Σ  (ρ i ε t-i   +  η i vt-i  + γ i ε t-i  +  ψ i vt-i)} + 
             j=0  i=j+1 
              ∞      ∞  
  +    {  λ  Σ  (1 - λ )
j Σ  (γ i ε t-i-1 + ψ i vt-i-1 ) } ]. 
              j=0   i=j 
Matching coefficients gives the solution: 
(A19)   γ 0  =  [ (1 - λ ) / λ ] ρ 0 
(A20)    γ j  =  [ (1 - λ )
t+1 / (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) ] ρ j  +  [1 - (λ  / (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) ) ] γ j-1 
(A21)   ψ 0 =  [ (1 - λ ) / λ  ] η 0 
(A22)   ψ j  = [ (1 - λ )
t+1 / (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) ] η j  +  [1 - (λ  / (1 - (1 - λ )
t+1 ) ) ] ψ j-1. 
  Given the MA parameters ρ j and η j, and a series for the shocks ε t and vt (all of which we 
obtain by OLS regressions on the data) we can generate a predicted employment series from 
(A17), which after applying the triangular filter in the text produces a series for smoothed 
employment: e
s
t. Note then first that, from (A17) and the additive nature of the smoother, 1/α  
factors out of the expressions for e
s
t. Second, that since ρ j, η j, ε t, and vt are determined by first stage 
OLS regressions, the only parameter left determining predicted smooth employment is λ , so that we 
can write α e
s
t=g(λ ), where g(.) is the function defined by (A17) and (A19) to (A22). The formula 
for our predicted unemployment series is: 
(A23)   ût  =  δ 0  –  (δ 1/α ) g(λ ) 






     T  
(A24)   Min    Σ  ( ut  -  ût )
2. 
         δ 0,δ 1/α ,λ      t=1      
  Finally, the decomposition of predicted unemployment in Figure 4, follows directly from 
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Actual and predicted unemployment with a four-quarter delay
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